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H 
Lindsay v. Pacific Topsoils, Inc.Wash.App. Div. 
1,2005. 
Court of Appeals of Washington,Division 1. 
James D. LINDSAY, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
PACIFIC TOPSOILS, INC., a Washington 
Corporation, and Dave and Sandra Forman, a marital 
community, Respondents/Cross-Appellants, 
Harbor Development Services, LLC, a Washington 
limited liability company, Third Party Defendant. 
No. 54487-0-1. 
Aug. 29, 2005. 
Publication Ordered Sept. 26, 2005. 
Background: After employee won favorable verdict 
on his wrongful discharge claim, parties filed various 
motions to determine amount of interest owed to 
employee on judgment. After finding that interest on 
verdict began to accrue from verdict date, but interest 
on costs and attorney fees began to accrue from later 
date of effective judgment, the Superior Court, King 
County, Glenna Hall J., ultimately entered order 
declaring that the judgment was satisfied in full. 
Employee appealed and employer cross-appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Appelwick, J., 
held that: 
(1) because judgment was affirmed on appeal, 
interest ran from date of verdict, and 
(2) amount of an award of attorney fees is not 
dispositive of the reasonableness of the award. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
111 Interest 219 € ^ 5 6 
219 Interest 
219III Time and Computation 
219k56 k. Mode of Computation in General. 
Most Cited Cases 
Judgment 228 €^>895 
228 Judgment 
228XX Payment, Satisfaction, Merger, and 
Discharge 
228k895 k. Entry of Credits on Partial 
Satisfaction. Most Cited Cases 
Trial court erred in treating payment by defendant as 
a partial satisfaction of the judgment, thereby causing 
interest to accrue only on the unpaid principal; 
because plaintiff could only withdraw the money 
from the court's registry if he agreed that the money 
constituted a full satisfaction of judgment, the 
payment was conditional, not partial satisfaction, and 
interest should have continued to accrue on the whole 
judgment. West's RCWA 4.56.100(1). 
121 Interest 219 €=>22(1) 
219 Interest 
2191 Rights and Liabilities in General 
219k22 Judgments 
219k22(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
The purpose of awarding interest on a judgment is to 
compensate a party having the right to use money 
when it has been denied use of that money. 
131 Appeal and Error 30 €=>893(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVKF) Trial De Novo 
30k892 Trial De Novo 
30k893 Cases Triable in Appellate Court 
3Qk893(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Court of Appeals reviews a trial court's application of 
a statute de novo. 
1H Interest 219 €^>39(3) 
219 Interest 
219111 Time and Computation 
219k39 Time from Which Interest Runs in 
General 
219k39(3) k. Interest from Date of 
Judgment or Decree. Most Cited Cases 
Trial court did not err in ruling that interest on 
plaintiffs judgment began to accrue from the date of 
the verdict and not the effective date of the judgment, 
since statute provides that when a verdict is affirmed 
on review, interest accrues from the date of the 
verdict, and that is what happened. West's RCWA 
4.56.110(4). 
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J51 Interest 219 € ^ 3 9 ( 3 ) 
219 Interest 
219III Time and Computation 
219k39 Time from Which Interest Runs in 
General 
219k39(3) k. Interest from Date of 
Judgment or Decree. Most Cited Cases 
Interest 219 €=>41.1 
219 Interest 
219III Time and Computation 
219k41 Stipulations as to Time 
219k41.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
While judgments generally bear interest from the date 
of entry, that rule changes to the date of the verdict 
once a judgment has been affirmed on appeal, and an 
agreed effective date of the judgment does not 
control the date for interest accrual after the case is 
affirmed on appeal. 
161 Appeal and Error 30 € ^ 8 9 3 ( 1 ) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVKF) Trial De Novo 
30k892 Trial De Novo 
30k893 Cases Triable in Appellate Court 
30k893(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Appeal and Error 30 € ^ 9 8 4 ( 5 ) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVKTO Discretion of Lower Court 
30k984 Costs and Allowances 
30k984(5) k. Attorneys' Fees. Most Cited 
Cases 
The test for reviewing an award of attorney fees is 
two-pronged: (1) court must determine whether the 
relevant statute provides for an award of fees, which 
is a question of law and is reviewed de novo, and (2) 
if it is established that a legal basis exists for the 
award, court reviews the amount of the award under 
the abuse of discretion standard. 
121 Labor and Employment 231H €=>327 
231H Labor and Employment 
231HV Intellectual Property Rights and Duties 
231Hk313 Actions 
231Hk327 k. Costs and Attorney Fees. Most 
Cited Cases 
Under statute providing that plaintiff who recovers 
judgment for wages or salary is entitled to attorney 
fees, successful plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees 
incurred in responding to defendant's motions to 
satisfy the judgment and motions to clarify the court's 
rulings, and was successful in opposing the motions 
and prevailed on the issue of when interest began to 
accrue; allowing a party who successfully obtains 
interest on money to which he or she is entitled to 
recover attorney fees is consistent with the broad, 
remedial purpose of the statute. West's RCWA 
49.48.030. 
181 Costs 102 €^>252 
102 Costs 
102X On Appeal or Error 
102k252 k. Attorney's Fees on Appeal or Error. 
Most Cited Cases 
In general, if the applicable law allows the trial court 
to grant attorney fees, that statute is also interpreted 
as allowing fees to the prevailing party on appeal, 
and should also apply to post-judgment litigation in 
defense of the amount of the judgment. 
121 Costs 102 €=>194.18 
102 Costs 
102 VIII Attorney Fees 
102kl94.18 k. Items and Amount; Hours; 
Rate. Most Cited Cases 
The amount of an award of attorney fees is not 
dispositive of the reasonableness of the award, and 
there is no abuse of discretion in a fee award when 
the only argument is that the fees grossly exceeded 
the value of the case. 
**104 William T. Grimm, Davis Grimm Payne & 
Marra, Jennifer L. Mora, Jackson Lewis LLP, Seattle, 
WA, for Appellant. 
James R. Dickens, Miller Nash LLP, Seattle, WA, for 
Respondents. 
APPELWICK, J. 
*675 f 1 James Lindsay won a favorable verdict on 
his employment claim against Pacific Topsoils, Inc., 
(PTI). Lindsay appeals the trial court's 
characterization of PTI's payment into the court's 
registry as a partial satisfaction of judgment, which 
stopped the accrual of interest. Lindsay disputed the 
amount of the judgment, and argues that because 
PTI's payment required that he accept the payment as 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
!2UF.3dl02 Page 3 
129 Wash.App. 672, 120 P.3d 102 
(Cite as: 129 Wash.App. 672,120 P.3d 102) 
judgment in full, it was a conditional payment, and 
interest should have continued to run until 
disbursement. We agree with Lindsay and reverse 
and remand for determination of the appropriate 
amount of interest. 
If 2 PTI cross-appeals the trial court's ruling that 
interest on the judgment began to run from the date 
of the verdict, not the date the judgment became 
effective. We affirm this ruling because PTI had 
unsuccessfully appealed the merits of the case, thus 
triggering the provisions of RCW 4.56.110(4) that 
require interest to run from the verdict date. We also 
affirm the award to Lindsay of attorney fees incurred 
establishing that the interest on the judgment ran 
effective from the date of the verdict. 
*676 FACTS 
1f 3 On February 14, 2002, James Lindsay obtained a 
favorable verdict against Pacific Topsoils, Inc. and 
Dave and Sandra Forman (PTI). Lindsay had sued 
for wrongful discharge, breach of contract, 
promissory estoppel and negligent misrepresentation. 
The jury awarded Lindsay $2,028,083.00 — in 
damages. 
FN1. The judgment was for $2,028,088.00. 
f 4 The trial court ordered a stay of the entry of 
judgment that was filed on March 27, 2002. The 
judgment was stayed pending resolution of PTI's 
post-trial motions. The order established that: 
[i]f judgment in any amount is entered in favor of 
plaintiff Lindsay after this Court decides the post-trial 
motions set for April 4, 2002, as a condition of this 
stay defendants Pacific Topsoils, Inc. and Dave 
Forman agree that the judgment shall be effective as 
ofMarchl4,2002. 
The trial court entered judgment for Lindsay on May 
9, 2002, affirming the jury's verdict amount and 
awarding Lindsay additional costs and attorney fees 
in the amount of $114,976.56. 
1f 5 In June 2002, PTI appealed to this court, and in 
September 2003 we affirmed the judgment in favor 
of Lindsay. PTI filed a petition for review with the 
Washington State Supreme Court in October 2003, 
which was denied in May 2004. 
1 6 Meanwhile, on December 23, 2003, PTI filed a 
notice of payment of judgment in full into the court's 
registry. The amount PTI paid was $2,600,336.55, 
which included the initial verdict plus the costs and 
attorney fees awarded. This payment also included 
12 percent per annum interest on the judgment 
amount, calculated since March 14, 2002, the day the 
judgment was agreed effective. The notice stated 
that the money "is available immediately to plaintiff 
James D. Lindsay in exchange for entry of a full 
satisfaction of judgment for this amount per RCW 
4.56.100(1)." 
*677 f^ 7 The next day PTI filed a motion requesting 
the trial court declare that PTI had paid the judgment 
for Lindsay in full. Lindsay opposed the motion, 
arguing that the interest should have been calculated 
to accrue from February 14, 2002, the date of the 
verdict, instead of from March 14, 2002. In 
February 2004, the trial court denied PTI's motion. 
In response to PTI's motion for clarification, the trial 
court stated that interest on the verdict began to 
accrue from the verdict date, but interest on the costs 
and attorney fees began to accrue from the effective 
judgment date. 
**105 f 8 Litigation on this issue continued. PTI 
filed motions in February and May 2004 attempting 
to clarify the amount remaining that PTI was to pay. 
In April 2004, Lindsay requested costs and fees 
incurred in responding to PTI's motions. The trial 
court awarded Lindsay additional costs and attorney 
fees totaling $29,643.50. In response to PTI's May 
2004 motion, the trial court reiterated in June 2004 its 
holding regarding when interest began accruing. 
The court further ordered that PTI's December 2003 
payment into the court's registry was applied first to 
satisfy the accrued statutory interest, and then to the 
principal,— leaving $17,926.97 in unpaid principal 
as of December 2003. The court determined that 
PTI owed Lindsay $17,926.97 plus 12 percent 
interest per year on that amount, accruing from the 
date of the payment into the registry. The court 
reiterated that, in addition, PTI owed Lindsay the fees 
and costs awarded the month before. 
FN2. The principal included the costs and 
attorney fees awarded to Lindsay at trial. 
^ 9 PTI paid the indicated amount into the court's 
registry several days later. Lindsay requested 
reconsideration, asserting that the December 2003 
payment did not partially satisfy the judgment 
because it was conditional. Accordingly, Lindsay 
argued, he was entitled to post-judgment interest in 
the entire judgment through June 2004. But several 
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days later, the trial court entered an order declaring 
that the judgment was satisfied in full. 
f 10 Lindsay appeals the court's order declaring the 
judgment satisfied in full. PTI cross-appeals, 
assigning *678 error to the court's determination that 
interest began to accrue on the verdict date, and 
assigning error to the court's May 2004 award of fees 
and costs to Lindsay. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Characterization of the December Payment 
[111 11 Lindsay asserts that the trial court's June 3, 
2004 order specifying the amounts PTI still owed 
Lindsay was in error.— Specifically, he claims that 
the trial court should not have treated the December 
2003 payment as a partial satisfaction of the 
judgment, thereby causing interest to accrue only on 
the unpaid principal. Instead, Lindsay claims that 
the December 2003 payment was conditional, and 
accordingly, interest should have continued to accrue 
on the whole judgment. 
FN3. Lindsay also assigns error to the trial 
court's denial of his motion for 
reconsideration, and the trial court's order on 
satisfaction of judgment in full. As these 
assignments of error all flow from the same 
issue, we do not address them separately. 
T| 12 PTI further contends that Lindsay was free to 
remove the December 2003 funds from the registry at 
any time, and thus the tender of funds was not 
conditional. PTI argues that the provision indicating 
the money was "full satisfaction of judgment for this 
amount " meant that the judgment was satisfied as to 
the amount of money tendered, "limiting the dispute 
to only the additional $17,926.97 Lindsay requested." 
[211 13 PTI is incorrect. PTI's notice of payment of 
judgment in frill contained the provision that the 
money "is available immediately to plaintiff James 
D. Lindsay in exchange for entry of a full satisfaction 
of judgment for this amount per RCW 4.56.100(1)." 
This clause constituted a condition-Lindsay could 
only withdraw the money if he agreed that the money 
constituted a full satisfaction of judgment. "The 
purpose of awarding interest on a judgment is to 
compensate a party having the right to use money 
when it has been denied use of that money." 
*679Aguirre v. AT & T Wireless Services, 118 
Wash.App. 236, 24 L 75 P.3d 603 (2003V Because 
Lindsay was denied use of the money due to the 
condition on the payment, interest should have 
continued to run on the entire judgment, from the 
date of the verdict until the date of disbursement. 
% 14 This result is supported by case law. In Steele 
v. Lundzren, 96 Wash.App. 773. 787, 982 P.2d 619 
(1999), judgment was entered in favor of the 
plaintiff, and the defendant** 106 paid the judgment 
into the court's registry, "with an instruction that the 
funds should be held until further order of the court." 
The plaintiff was granted writs of garnishment and 
sought supplemental proceedings. Lundgren, 96 
Wash.App. at 787. 982 P.2d 619. She also sought an 
order of disbursement, requesting that the payment 
only be considered partial satisfaction of the 
judgment because she was entitled to interest. 
Lundzren, 96 Wash.App. at 787, 982 P.2d 619. The 
trial court granted interest from the date of the 
judgment onwards. Lundzren, 96 Wash.App. at 787, 
982 P.2d 619. On appeal, the defendant argued the 
interest award was in error because the plaintiff had a 
duty to limit her damages. The court noted that 
"there was some confusion whether the funds were 
available and would be released unconditionally," 
and accordingly upheld the award of post-judgment 
interest. Lundzren, 96 Wash.App. at 787, 982 P.2d 
619. Similarly, here there was a provision that 
established a condition on the December 2003 funds' 
release. The rationale in Lundzren is thus applicable 
to the case at hand. 
1 \5Inre Bailey's Estate. 56 Wash.2d 623. 354 P.2d 
920 (1960), further supports this result. In Bailey, a 
woman bought property at an auction, but failed to 
pay the amount of the bid. Bailey, 56 Wash.2d at 
625, 354 P.2d 920. After a court entered a judgment 
against her, the appellant deposited only a portion of 
the money with the clerk of the court. Bailey, 56 
Wash.2d at 625, 354 P.2d 920. Several months later, 
the trial court entered an order authorizing the clerk 
to pay the amount received by the appellant. Bailey, 
56 Wash.2d at 626. 354 P.2d 920. The trial court-
ruled that the opposing party should recover interest 
on the entire amount up until that date. Bailey. 56 
Wash.2d at 626, 354 P.2d 920. *680 The Bailey 
Court reasoned that: 
although appellant paid this amount into the clerk of 
the court on the aforesaid date, she did not direct the 
clerk to apply this payment to a reduction of the 
amount of the judgment. The clerk made no docket 
entry indicating partial satisfaction of judgment; nor 
did he release payment ... until the court had issued 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
1/UF id 102 
129 Wash App 672, 120 P 3d 102 
(Cite as: 129 Wash.App. 672,120 P.3d 102) 
Page 5 
its order authorizing him to do so We are 
convinced that under these circumstances interest 
was properly chargeable on the entire amount of the 
judgment up to [the order date], m accordance with 
the trial court's ruling 
Bailey. 56 Wash 2d at 628, 354 P 2d 920 Since PTI 
did not direct the clerk to apply the payment as 
partial satisfaction, and the clerk did not do so, Bailey 
supports a finding that the December 2003 payment 
was not partial satisfaction 
\ 16 PTI argues that post-judgment interest is an 
equitable remedy and because Lindsay initially 
refused payment of the judgment for tax purposes, he 
should not be entitled to post-judgment interest on 
the full amount Essentially, PTI claims that because 
Lindsay did not accept payment before the December 
2003 deposit and did not move to withdraw the 
deposited amount for several months, he contributed 
to the delay and should not be permitted to profit 
from it But Lindsay had good cause not to accept 
the payment-he believed he was entitled to a greater 
amount of interest Further, the wording of the 
notice of payment of judgment in full left Lindsay 
vulnerable to forfeiture of that claim if he had 
withdrawn the money Under the circumstances, 
equitable principles do not dictate that Lmdsay be 
deprived of interest on the entire amount of the 
judgment 
f 17 The trial court erred in determining that the 
deposit of funds in the registry stopped the running of 
mterest on the judgment Lindsay is entitled to 
interest on the judgment from the date of the verdict 
until the date that registry funds were disbursed to 
him Accordingly, on remand, the trial court must 
recalculate the interest due, adjust the application of 
moneys paid to interest and to principle, and 
determine what amounts remain unpaid 
*681 II. Date that Interest Began to Accrue 
\ 18 PTI contends that the trial court erred in 
denying PTI's motion for satisfaction of judgment m 
relation to the December **107 23, 2003 payment 
— Specifically, PTI claims that the trial court erred 
m holding that interest on the judgment began to 
accrue on the verdict date, rather than on the date the 
judgment was effective PTI claims that Washington 
case law establishes this proposition, and further, that 
the parties contracted that the mterest would begin to 
accrue on the effective date of the judgment 
FN4 Lindsay claims that PTI did not timely 
file a notice of cross-appeal, and, thus, some 
of the issues PTI has raised m its cross-
appeal are not properly before this court 
Specifically, Lindsay claims that because 
PTI did not file a Notice of Appeal withm 
30 days of the specific trial court decision 
PTI wanted reviewed, PTPs cross-appeal 
should be dismissed However, a 
commissioner of this court heard this issue 
and decided m favor of PTI Accordmgly, 
we consider PTI's cross-appeal 
HI If 19 RCW4 56 110(4) m provides, in pertinent 
part 
FN5 In 2004, the legislature added a section 
to this statute, changing then RCW 
4 56 110(3) to RCW 4 56 110(4) 
[ Judgments shall bear interest from the date of entry 
at the maximum rate permitted under RCW 
19 52 020 on the date of entry thereof In any case 
where a court is directed on review to enter judgment 
on a verdict or in any case where a judgment entered 
on a verdict is wholly or partly affirmed on review, 
interest on the judgment or on that portion of the 
judgment affirmed shall date back to and shall accrue 
from the date the verdict was rendered 
We review a trial court's application of a statute de 
novo Hadley v Maxwell 120 Wash App 137, 145, 
84 P 3d 286 (2004) 
[4] 11 20 The trial court did not err in holding that 
interest began to accrue from the date of the verdict 
because the language of RCW 4 56 110(4) dictates 
that result The statute provides that when a verdict 
is affirmed on review, interest accrues from the date 
of the verdict This is exactly what happened in this 
case PTI appealed the verdict to this court, and we 
affirmed The Washington Supreme Court denied 
certiorari Accordingly, under the *682 plam 
language of RCW 4 56 110(4), the interest began to 
accrue from the date of the verdict 
f 21 Case law is also in accord with this 
interpretation In Hadley, 120 Wash App at 140, 84 
P3d 2861 the plaintiffs obtained a favorable 
judgment The defendants appealed to Division 
Three of this Court, which affirmed Hadley, 120 
Wash APP at 140, 84 P3d 286 The defendants 
then appealed to the Washington Supreme Court 
solely on a liability issue, and the court reversed 
© 2007 Thomson/West No Claim to Orig U S Govt Works 
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Hadlev, 120 Wash.App. at 140, 84 P.3d 286. On 
remand, a jury found for the plaintiffs again. Hadlev, 
120 Wash.App. at 140, 84 P.3d 286. The plaintiffs 
sought interest on the earlier damages verdict 
accruing from the date of the verdict. Hadlev 120 
Wash.App. at 140, 84 P.3d 286. Division Three 
agreed, noting that the Supreme Court had only 
reversed on the liability issue, thus impliedly 
affirming the earlier damages award. Hadlev, 120 
Wash.App. at 146-47, 84 P.3d 286. The Hadlev 
court then concluded that because it had affirmed the 
earlier damages award without challenge, the interest 
accrued from the date of the earlier verdict. Hadlev, 
120 Wash.App. at 147, 84 P.3d 286. 
f 22 PTI claims that Kiesslinz v. N. W. Greyhound 
Lines, 38 Wash.2d 289, 229 P.2d 335 (1951), and 
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 
142 Wash.2d 654, 15 P.3d 115 (2000) dictate a 
different result. PTI is incorrect. In Kiessling, the 
Court held that u[t]here is no statute in this state 
providing for the accrual of interest from the date of a 
verdict." Kiesslim, 38 Wash.2d at 297, 229 P.2d 
335. However, Kiessling was decided before the 
pertinent provision of RCW 4.56.110(4) was enacted. 
Accordingly, it is not dispositive. 
1 23 Weyerhaeuser is also not dispositive. In that 
case, Weyerhaeuser sought a declaration of coverage 
from numerous insurance companies with regard to 
property damage at several allegedly polluted sites 
that Weyerhaeuser was required to clean up. 
Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at 661, 15 P.3d 115. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the insurers with respect to some of the sites. 
Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at 662, 15 P.3d 115. 
On appeal, summary judgment was reversed, and the 
issue went to **108 trial. 'k6S3Weverhaeuser, 142 
Wash.2d at 662-63. 15 P.3d 115. After a jury found 
for Weyerhaeuser, the trial court awarded interest on 
the cost of the clean-up of one of the sites from the 
date of the verdict. Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at 
687, 15 P.3d 115. The Court on appeal cited 
Kiessling and held that interest for the nonliquidated 
damages ran only from the date of judgment. 
Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at 687, 15 P.3d 115. 
However, in Weyerhaeuser, the appeal reversed a 
summary judgment and reinstated the case. No 
judgment on the merits existed at that time, therefore 
no judgment was affirmed on appeal. When the trial 
court entered judgment and awarded interest dating 
back to the verdict, the provision in RCW 
4.56.110(4) had not yet been triggered and interest 
dating back to the verdict was not yet appropriate. 
Fage o 
[5] \ 24 PTI also asserts that Lindsay is estopped 
from claiming that interest accrual began on the 
verdict date because Lindsay agreed that the 
judgment would be effective on March 14, 2002. 
While it is true that Lindsay signed the order staying 
judgment that stated that the original judgment would 
be effective on March 14, 2002, this order does not 
even reference RCW 4.56.110(4), let alone expressly 
purport to modify the parties' statutory rights after the 
judgment has been affirmed on review. While 
judgments generally bear interest from the date of 
entry, that rule changes to the date of the verdict once 
a judgment has been affirmed on appeal. 
Accordingly, the agreed effective date of the 
judgment does not control the date for interest 
accrual after the case was affirmed on appeal. 
III. Award of Fees to Lindsay 
H 25 PTI asserts that the trial court erred in awarding 
Lindsay attorney fees in responding to PTI's efforts to 
satisfy the judgment. PTI claims that fees could only 
be awarded under RCW 49.48.030, and that the 
subject of the dispute is so far removed from the 
purpose of that statute that the fees were not justified. 
Further, PTI contends, the amount of fees awarded 
was so out of proportion to the amount of money in 
dispute that the award was unreasonable. 
[6] *684 \ 26 The test for reviewing an award of 
attorney fees is two-pronged. First, we must 
determine whether the relevant statute provides for an 
award of fees; this is a question of law and is 
reviewed de novo. Mehlenbacher v. DeMont, 103 
Wash.App. 240, 244, 11 P.3d 871 (2000). Once we 
have established that a legal basis exists for the 
award, we then review the amount of the award under 
the abuse of discretion standard. Tradewell Group, 
Inc. v. Mavis, 71 Wash.App. 120, 126, 857 P.2d 1053 
(1993). 
J71T[ 27 RCW 49.48.030 provides, in pertinent part, 
that "[i]n any action in which any person is 
successful in recovering judgment for wages or salary 
owed to him, reasonable attorney's fees, in an amount 
to be determined by the court, shall be assessed 
against said employer or former employer [.]" The 
statute is remedial and is entitled to liberal 
construction to effect its purpose. Dautel v. Heritage 
Home Center, Inc., 89 Wash.App. 148, 152, 948 P.2d 
397(1997). 
f 28 The statute provides a basis for the trial court's 
award of fees to Lindsay. Lindsay requested fees for 
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responding to PTI's motions to satisfy the judgment 
and motions to clarify the court's rulings. Lindsay 
also requested fees for discussions with PTI 
attempting to resolve the dispute. Lindsay was 
successful in opposing PTI's motions and prevailed 
on the issue of when interest began to accrue. "The 
purpose of awarding interest on a judgment is to 
compensate a party having the right to use money 
when it has been denied use of that money." Aguirre, 
118 Wash.App. at 24 L 15 P.3d 603. Establishing 
the amount of interest due is part of determining the 
amount of recovery to which the party is entitled. 
This is not so far removed from the purposes of a 
statute that is aimed at compensating individuals who 
successfully bring wage and salary claims. An 
interpretation of RCW 49.48.030 that allows a party 
who successfully obtains interest on money to which 
he or she is entitled to recover attorney fees is 
consistent with the broad, remedial purpose of the 
statute. Accordingly, the statute supports the fee 
award. 
[81 *685 t 29 PTI notes that the issue of whether 
RCW 49.48.030 allows for attorney fees in post-
judgment litigation has not been **109 decided in 
Washington. While this is true, there are cases from 
other jurisdictions that support Lindsay's position. In 
Velez v. Vassallo, 203 F.Supp.2d. 312, 315 
(S.D.N.Y.2002), the defendants challenged a Fair 
Labor Standards Act claim default judgment against 
them almost a year after the judgment. The 
reviewing court held that plaintiffs were entitled to 
reasonable fees and costs in defending that motion, 
noting that "prevailing plaintiffs in FLSA cases are 
entitled to attorneys fees for prosecuting or defending 
appeals. Plaintiffs successful defense of a post-
judgment motion is indistinguishable in principle." 
Velez, 203 F.Supp.2d at 315 (internal citations 
omitted). Similarly, in Wevant v. Okst, 198 F.3d 
31L 316 (2nd Cir.1999). the court held that "[a] 
prevailing 1983 plaintiff is entitled to recover 
reasonable attorneys fees," and that "[t]his principle 
applies not only to the cost of obtaining a favorable 
judgment but also to the cost of successfully 
defending that judgment, whether against post-
judgment motions, or against an appeal." (internal 
citations omitted). In general, if the applicable law 
allows the trial court to grant attorney fees, that 
statute is also interpreted as allowing fees to the 
prevailing party on appeal. 14A Karl B. Tegland, 
Washington Practice: Civil Procedure 37.13, at 572 
(1st ed.2003). This rule should also apply to post-
judgment litigation in defense of the amount of the 
judgment. 
\ 30 Further, the amount awarded was not an abuse 
of discretion. Lindsays attorney submitted a bill for 
services rendered for Lindsay between November 
2003 and April 2004. This bill included costs and 
fees for services related to opposing PTIs motions 
regarding interest and the removal of liens on PTIs 
properties. The total amount of the bill was 
$29,681.00. The trial court awarded Lindsay 
$29,643.00, apparently accepting virtually all of the 
fees and costs as reasonable. PTI asserts that the fee 
award is unreasonable because it is significantly more 
than the *686 amount in controversy. PTI points out 
that while the award was over $29,000, the amount in 
controversy was only one months interest: 
$17,926.97. 
[21 f 31 PTIs assertions are unavailing. The amount 
of the award is not dispositive of the reasonableness 
of the award. Further, PTI has made no specific 
allegations that the hourly fee charged was 
unreasonable or that Lindsays attorneys charged for 
hours spent on unsuccessful claims, duplicated effort, 
or otherwise unproductive time. See Mayer v. City 
of Seattle, 102 Wash.App. 66, 82, 10 P.3d 408 
(2000). Washington courts have refused to find 
abuse of discretion in a fee award when the only 
argument is that the fees grossly exceeded the value 
of the case. See, e.g., Lav v. Hass, 112 Wash.App. 
818,826,51 P.3d 130(2002) (refusing to overturn an 
award when the defendant's sole argument was that 
the fee awarded was 31 times the total value of the 
case). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
the award of fees. 
IV. Lindsay's Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal 
f 32 Lindsay requests his attorney fees under RAP 
18.1 and RCW 49.48.030 for both his underlying 
action and in defending his result against PTI's cross-
appeal. As previously noted, RCW 49.48.030 
provides that employees who successfully recover 
judgment for wages or salary owed shall receive 
reasonable attorney fees. Lindsay has prevailed on 
his appeal, and he has successfully defended against 
PTI's cross-appeal. Accordingly, we award him his 
attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
% 33 Affirmed in part. Reversed in part and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
WE CONCUR: ELLINGTON, A.C.J., and BAKER, 
J. 
Wash.App. Div. 1,2005. 
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Background: After employee won favorable verdict 
on his wrongful discharge claim, parties filed various 
motions to determine amount of interest owed to 
employee on judgment. After finding that interest on 
verdict began to accrue from verdict date, but interest 
on costs and attorney fees began to accrue from later 
date of effective judgment, the Superior Court, King 
County, Glenna Hall J., ultimately entered order 
declaring that the judgment was satisfied in full. 
Employee appealed and employer cross-appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Appelwick, J., 
held that: 
(1) because judgment was affirmed on appeal, 
interest ran from date of verdict, and 
(2) amount of an award of attorney fees is not 
dispositive of the reasonableness of the award. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. 
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APPELW1CK,J. 
*675 | 1 James Lindsay won a favorable verdict on 
his employment claim against Pacific Topsoils, Inc., 
(PTI). Lindsay appeals the trial court's 
characterization of PTI's payment into the court's 
registry as a partial satisfaction of judgment, which 
stopped the accrual of interest. Lindsay disputed the 
amount of the judgment, and argues that because 
PTI's payment required that he accept the payment as 
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judgment in full, it was a conditional payment, and 
interest should have continued to run until 
disbursement. We agree with Lindsay and reverse 
and remand for determination of the appropriate 
amount of interest. 
f 2 PTI cross-appeals the trial court's ruling that 
interest on the judgment began to run from the date 
of the verdict, not the date the judgment became 
effective. We affirm this ruling because PTI had 
unsuccessfully appealed the merits of the case, thus 
triggering the provisions of RCW 4.56.110(4) that 
require interest to run from the verdict date. We also 
affirm the award to Lindsay of attorney fees incurred 
establishing that the interest on the judgment ran 
effective from the date of the verdict. 
*676 FACTS 
f 3 On February 14, 2002, James Lindsay obtained a 
favorable verdict against Pacific Topsoils, Inc. and 
Dave and Sandra Forman (PTI). Lindsay had sued 
for wrongful discharge, breach of contract, 
promissory estoppel and negligent misrepresentation. 
The jury awarded Lindsay $2,028,083.00 — in 
damages. 
FN1. The judgment was for $2,028,088.00. 
| 4 The trial court ordered a stay of the entry of 
judgment that was filed on March 27, 2002. The 
judgment was stayed pending resolution of PTI's 
post-trial motions. The order established that: 
[i]f judgment in any amount is entered in favor of 
plaintiff Lindsay after this Court decides the post-trial 
motions set for April 4, 2002, as a condition of this 
stay defendants Pacific Topsoils, Inc. and Dave 
Forman agree that the judgment shall be effective as 
ofMarchl4,2002. 
The trial court entered judgment for Lindsay on May 
9, 2002, affirming the jury's verdict amount and 
awarding Lindsay additional costs and attorney fees 
in the amount of $114,976.56. 
K 5 In June 2002, PTI appealed to this court, and in 
September 2003 we affirmed the judgment in favor 
of Lindsay. PTI filed a petition for review with the 
Washington State Supreme Court in October 2003, 
which was denied in May 2004. 
f 6 Meanwhile, on December 23, 2003, PTI filed a 
notice of payment of judgment in full into the court's 
registry. The amount PTI paid was $2,600,336.55, 
which included the initial verdict plus the costs and 
attorney fees awarded. This payment also included 
12 percent per annum interest on the judgment 
amount, calculated since March 14, 2002, the day the 
judgment was agreed effective. The notice stated 
that the money "is available immediately to plaintiff 
James D. Lindsay in exchange for entry of a full 
satisfaction of judgment for this amount per RCW 
4.56.100(1)." 
*677 f 7 The next day PTI filed a motion requesting 
the trial court declare that PTI had paid the judgment 
for Lindsay in full. Lindsay opposed the motion, 
arguing that the interest should have been calculated 
to accrue from February 14, 2002, the date of the 
verdict, instead of from March 14, 2002. In 
February 2004, the trial court denied PTI's motion. 
In response to PTI's motion for clarification, the trial 
court stated that interest on the verdict began to 
accrue from the verdict date, but interest on the costs 
and attorney fees began to accrue from the effective 
judgment date. 
**105 | 8 Litigation on this issue continued. PTI 
filed motions in February and May 2004 attempting 
to clarify the amount remaining that PTI was to pay. 
In April 2004, Lindsay requested costs and fees 
incurred in responding to PTI's motions. The trial 
court awarded Lindsay additional costs and attorney 
fees totaling $29,643.50. In response to PTI's May 
2004 motion, the trial court reiterated in June 2004 its 
holding regarding when interest began accruing. 
The court further ordered that PTI's December 2003 
payment into the court's registry was applied first to 
satisfy the accrued statutory interest, and then to the 
principal,— leaving $17,926.97 in unpaid principal 
as of December 2003. The court determined that 
PTI owed Lindsay $17,926.97 plus 12 percent 
interest per year on that amount, accruing from the 
date of the payment into the registry. The court 
reiterated that, in addition, PTI owed Lindsay the fees 
and costs awarded the month before. 
FN2. The principal included the costs and 
attorney fees awarded to Lindsay at trial. 
f 9 PTI paid the indicated amount into the court's 
registry several days later. Lindsay requested 
reconsideration, asserting that the December 2003 
payment did not partially satisfy the judgment 
because it was conditional. Accordingly, Lindsay 
argued, he was entitled to post-judgment interest in 
the entire judgment through June 2004. But several 
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days later, the trial court entered an order declaring 
that the judgment was satisfied in full. 
f 10 Lindsay appeals the court's order declaring the 
judgment satisfied in full. PTI cross-appeals, 
assigning *678 error to the court's determination that 
interest began to accrue on the verdict date, and 
assigning error to the court's May 2004 award of fees 
and costs to Lindsay. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Characterization of the December Payment 
HI 1f 11 Lindsay asserts that the trial court's June 3, 
2004 order specifying the amounts PTI still owed 
Lindsay was in error.— Specifically, he claims that 
the trial court should not have treated the December 
2003 payment as a partial satisfaction of the 
judgment, thereby causing interest to accrue only on 
the unpaid principal. Instead, Lindsay claims that 
the December 2003 payment was conditional, and 
accordingly, interest should have continued to accrue 
on the whole judgment. 
FN3. Lindsay also assigns error to the trial 
court's denial of his motion for 
reconsideration, and the trial court's order on 
satisfaction of judgment in full. As these 
assignments of error all flow from the same 
issue, we do not address them separately. 
K 12 PTI further contends that Lindsay was free to 
remove the December 2003 funds from the registry at 
any time, and thus the tender of funds was not 
conditional. PTI argues that the provision indicating 
the money was "full satisfaction of judgment for this 
amount " meant that the judgment was satisfied as to 
the amount of money tendered, "limiting the dispute 
to only the additional $17,926.97 Lindsay requested." 
1211 13 PTI is incorrect. PTI's notice of payment of 
judgment in fiill contained the provision that the 
money "is available immediately to plaintiff James 
D. Lindsay in exchange for entry of a full satisfaction 
of judgment for this amount per RCW 4.56.100(1)." 
This clause constituted a condition-Lindsay could 
only withdraw the money if he agreed that the money 
constituted a full satisfaction of judgment. "The 
purpose of awarding interest on a judgment is to 
compensate a party having the right to use money 
when it has been denied use of that money." 
* 679Aguirre v. AT & T Wireless Services, 118 
Wash.App. 236, 241, 75 P.3d 603 (2003). Because 
Lindsay was denied use of the money due to the 
condition on the payment, interest should have 
continued to run on the entire judgment, from the 
date of the verdict until the date of disbursement. 
| 14 This result is supported by case law. In Steele 
v. Lundzren, 96 Wash.App. 773. 787, 982 P.2d 619 
(1999), judgment was entered in favor of the 
plaintiff, and the defendant** 106 paid the judgment 
into the court's registry, "with an instruction that the 
funds should be held until further order of the court." 
The plaintiff was granted writs of garnishment and 
sought supplemental proceedings. Lundzren, 96 
Wash.App. at 787, 982 P.2d 619. She also sought an 
order of disbursement, requesting that the payment 
only be considered partial satisfaction of the 
judgment because she was entitled to interest. 
Lundzren, 96 Wash.App. at 787, 982 P.2d 619. The 
trial court granted interest from the date of the 
judgment onwards. Lundzren, 96 Wash.App. at 787, 
982 P.2d 619. On appeal, the defendant argued the 
interest award was in error because the plaintiff had a 
duty to limit her damages. The court noted that 
"there was some confusion whether the funds were 
available and would be released unconditionally," 
and accordingly upheld the award of post-judgment 
interest. Lundzren, 96 Wash.App. at 787, 982 P.2d 
619. Similarly, here there was a provision that 
established a condition on the December 2003 funds' 
release. The rationale in Lundzren is thus applicable 
to the case at hand. 
f \5Inre Bailey's Estate, 56 Wash.2d 623, 354 P.2d 
920 (1960), further supports this result. In Bailey, a 
woman bought property at an auction, but failed to 
pay the amount of the bid. Bailey, 56 Wash.2d at 
625, 354 P.2d 920. After a court entered a judgment 
against her, the appellant deposited only a portion of 
the money with the clerk of the court. Bailey, 56 
Wash.2d at 625, 354 P.2d 920. Several months later, 
the trial court entered an order authorizing the clerk 
to pay the amount received by the appellant. Bailey, 
56 Wash.2d at 626, 354 P.2d 920. The trial court-
ruled that the opposing party should recover interest 
on the entire amount up until that date. Bailey, 56 
Wash.2d at 626, 354 P.2d 920. *680 The Bailey 
Court reasoned that: 
although appellant paid this amount into the clerk of 
the court on the aforesaid date, she did not direct the 
clerk to apply this payment to a reduction of the 
amount of the judgment. The clerk made no docket 
entry indicating partial satisfaction of judgment; nor 
did he release payment ... until the court had issued 
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its ... order authorizing him to do so. We are 
convinced that under these circumstances interest 
was properly chargeable on the entire amount of the 
judgment up to [the order date], in accordance with 
the trial court's ruling. 
Bailey, 56 Wash.2d at 628, 354 P.2d 920. Since PTI 
did not direct the clerk to apply the payment as 
partial satisfaction, and the clerk did not do so, Bailey 
supports a finding that the December 2003 payment 
was not partial satisfaction. 
f 16 PTI argues that post-judgment interest is an 
equitable remedy and because Lindsay initially 
refused payment of the judgment for tax purposes, he 
should not be entitled to post-judgment interest on 
the full amount. Essentially, PTI claims that because 
Lindsay did not accept payment before the December 
2003 deposit and did not move to withdraw the 
deposited amount for several months, he contributed 
to the delay and should not be permitted to profit 
from it. But Lindsay had good cause not to accept 
the payment-he believed he was entitled to a greater 
amount of interest. Further, the wording of the 
notice of payment of judgment in full left Lindsay 
vulnerable to forfeiture of that claim if he had 
withdrawn the money. Under the circumstances, 
equitable principles do not dictate that Lindsay be 
deprived of interest on the entire amount of the 
judgment. 
\ 17 The trial court erred in determining that the 
deposit of funds in the registry stopped the running of 
interest on the judgment. Lindsay is entitled to 
interest on the judgment from the date of the verdict 
until the date that registry funds were disbursed to 
him. Accordingly, on remand, the trial court must 
recalculate the interest due, adjust the application of 
moneys paid to interest and to principle, and 
determine what amounts remain unpaid. 
*681 II. Date that Interest Began to Accrue 
% 18 PTI contends that the trial court erred in 
denying PTI's motion for satisfaction of judgment in 
relation to the December **107 23, 2003 payment. 
— Specifically, PTI claims that the trial court erred 
in holding that interest on the judgment began to 
accrue on the verdict date, rather than on the date the 
judgment was effective. PTI claims that Washington 
case law establishes this proposition, and further, that 
the parties contracted that the interest would begin to 
accrue on the effective date of the judgment. 
FN4. Lindsay claims that PTI did not timely 
file a notice of cross-appeal, and, thus, some 
of the issues PTI has raised in its cross-
appeal are not properly before this court. 
Specifically, Lindsay claims that because 
PTI did not file a Notice of Appeal within 
30 days of the specific trial court decision 
PTI wanted reviewed, PTI's cross-appeal 
should be dismissed. However, a 
commissioner of this court heard this issue 
and decided in favor of PTI. Accordingly, 
we consider PTI's cross-appeal. 
121 If 19 RCW4.56.il 0(4) m provides, in pertinent 
part: 
FN5. In 2004, the legislature added a section 
to this statute, changing then RCW 
4.56.110(3) to RCW 4.56.110(4). 
[Jjudgments shall bear interest from the date of entry 
at the maximum rate permitted under RCW 
19.52.020 on the date of entry thereof. In any case 
where a court is directed on review to enter judgment 
on a verdict or in any case where a judgment entered 
on a verdict is wholly or partly affirmed on review, 
interest on the judgment or on that portion of the 
judgment affirmed shall date back to and shall accrue 
from the date the verdict was rendered. 
We review a trial court's application of a statute de 
novo. Hadley v. Maxwell 120 Wash.App. 137, 145, 
84 P.3d 286 (2004). 
[4J f 20 The trial court did not err in holding that 
interest began to accrue from the date of the verdict 
because the language of RCW 4.56.110(4) dictates 
that result. The statute provides that when a verdict 
is affirmed on review, interest accrues from the date 
of the verdict. This is exactly what happened in this 
case. PTI appealed the verdict to this court, and we 
affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court denied 
certiorari. Accordingly, under the *682 plain 
language of RCW 4.56.110(4), the interest began to 
accrue from the date of the verdict. 
| 21 Case law is also in accord with this 
interpretation. In Hadley, 120 Wash.App. at 140, 84 
P.3d 286, the plaintiffs obtained a favorable 
judgment. The defendants appealed to Division 
Three of this Court, which affirmed. Hadley, 120 
Wash.App. at 140, 84 P.3d 286. The defendants 
then appealed to the Washington Supreme Court 
solely on a liability issue, and the court reversed. 
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Hadlev. 120 Wash.App. at 140, 84 P.3d 286. On 
remand, a jury found for the plaintiffs again. Hadlev, 
120 Wash.App. at 140, 84 P.3d 286. The plaintiffs 
sought interest on the earlier damages verdict 
accruing from the date of the verdict. Hadlev, 120 
Wash.App. at 140, 84 P.3d 286. Division Three 
agreed, noting that the Supreme Court had only 
reversed on the liability issue, thus impliedly 
affirming the earlier damages award. Hadlev 120 
Wash.App. at 146-47, 84 P.3d 286. The Hadlev 
court then concluded that because it had affirmed the 
earlier damages award without challenge, the interest 
accrued from the date of the earlier verdict. Hadlev, 
120 Wash.App. at 147, 84 P.3d 286. 
\ 22 PTI claims that Kiessling v. N. W. Greyhound 
Lines. 38 Wash.2d 289, 229 P.2d 335 0951), and 
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 
142 Wash.2d 654, 15 P.3d 115 (2000) dictate a 
different result. PTI is incorrect. In Kiessling, the 
Court held that "[tjhere is no statute in this state 
providing for the accrual of interest from the date of a 
verdict." Kiesslinz. 38 Wash.2d at 297, 229 P.2d 
335. However, Kiessling was decided before the 
pertinent provision of RCW 4.56.110(4) was enacted. 
Accordingly, it is not dispositive. 
t 23 Weyerhaeuser is also not dispositive. In that 
case, Weyerhaeuser sought a declaration of coverage 
from numerous insurance companies with regard to 
property damage at several allegedly polluted sites 
that Weyerhaeuser was required to clean up. 
Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at 661, 15 P.3d 115. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the insurers with respect to some of the sites. 
Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at 662, 15 P.3d 115. 
On appeal, summary judgment was reversed, and the 
issue went to **108 trial. *683Weyerhaeuser, 142 
Wash.2d at 662-63, 15P.3d 115. After a jury found 
for Weyerhaeuser, the trial court awarded interest on 
the cost of the clean-up of one of the sites from the 
date of the verdict. Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at 
687, 15 P.3d 115. The Court on appeal cited 
Kiessling and held that interest for the nonliquidated 
damages ran only from the date of judgment. 
Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at 687, 15 P.3d 115. 
However, in Weyerhaeuser, the appeal reversed a 
summary judgment and reinstated the case. No 
judgment on the merits existed at that time, therefore 
no judgment was affirmed on appeal. When the trial 
court entered judgment and awarded interest dating 
back to the verdict, the provision in RCW 
4.56.110(4) had not yet been triggered and interest 
dating back to the verdict was not yet appropriate. 
Page 6 
[5] 1 24 PTI also asserts that Lindsay is estopped 
from claiming that interest accrual began on the 
verdict date because Lindsay agreed that the 
judgment would be effective on March 14, 2002. 
While it is true that Lindsay signed the order staying 
judgment that stated that the original judgment would 
be effective on March 14, 2002, this order does not 
even reference RCW 4.56.110(4), let alone expressly 
purport to modify the parties' statutory rights after the 
judgment has been affirmed on review. While 
judgments generally bear interest from the date of 
entry, that rule changes to the date of the verdict once 
a judgment has been affirmed on appeal. 
Accordingly, the agreed effective date of the 
judgment does not control the date for interest 
accrual after the case was affirmed on appeal. 
III. Award of Fees to Lindsay 
f 25 PTI asserts that the trial court erred in awarding 
Lindsay attorney fees in responding to PTI's efforts to 
satisfy the judgment. PTI claims that fees could only 
be awarded under RCW 49.48.030, and that the 
subject of the dispute is so far removed from the 
purpose of that statute that the fees were not justified. 
Further, PTI contends, the amount of fees awarded 
was so out of proportion to the amount of money in 
dispute that the award was unreasonable. 
[6] *684 f^ 26 The test for reviewing an award of 
attorney fees is two-pronged. First, we must 
determine whether the relevant statute provides for an 
award of fees; this is a question of law and is 
reviewed de novo. Mehlenbacher v. DeMont, 103 
Wash.App. 240, 244, 11 P.3d 871 (2000). Once we 
have established that a legal basis exists for the 
award, we then review the amount of the award under 
the abuse of discretion standard. Tradewell Group, 
Inc. v. Mavis. 71 Wash.App. 120, 126, 857 P.2d 1053 
(1993). 
121 If 27 RCW 49.48.030 provides, in pertinent part, 
that "[i]n any action in which any person is 
successful in recovering judgment for wages or salary 
owed to him, reasonable attorney's fees, in an amount 
to be determined by the court, shall be assessed 
against said employer or former employer [.]" The 
statute is remedial and is entitled to liberal 
construction to effect its purpose. Dautel v. Heritage 
Home Center, Inc.. 89 Wash.App. 148, 152, 948 P.2d 
397(1997). 
f 28 The statute provides a basis for the trial court's 
award of fees to Lindsay. Lindsay requested fees for 
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responding to PTI's motions to satisfy the judgment 
and motions to clarify the court's rulings. Lindsay 
also requested fees for discussions with PTI 
attempting to resolve the dispute. Lindsay was 
successful in opposing PTI's motions and prevailed 
on the issue of when interest began to accrue. "The 
purpose of awarding interest on a judgment is to 
compensate a party having the right to use money 
when it has been denied use of that money." Aguirre, 
118 Wash.App. at 241. 75 P.3d 603. Establishing 
the amount of interest due is part of determining the 
amount of recovery to which the party is entitled. 
This is not so far removed from the purposes of a 
statute that is aimed at compensating individuals who 
successfully bring wage and salary claims. An 
interpretation of RCW 49.48.030 that allows a party 
who successfully obtains interest on money to which 
he or she is entitled to recover attorney fees is 
consistent with the broad, remedial purpose of the 
statute. Accordingly, the statute supports the fee 
award. 
[81 *685 % 29 PTI notes that the issue of whether 
RCW 49.48.030 allows for attorney fees in post-
judgment litigation has not been **109 decided in 
Washington. While this is true, there are cases from 
other jurisdictions that support Lindsay's position. In 
Velez v. Vassallo. 203 F.Supp.2d. 312, 315 
(S.D.N.Y.2002), the defendants challenged a Fair 
Labor Standards Act claim default judgment against 
them almost a year after the judgment. The 
reviewing court held that plaintiffs were entitled to 
reasonable fees and costs in defending that motion, 
noting that "prevailing plaintiffs in FLSA cases are 
entitled to attorneys fees for prosecuting or defending 
appeals. Plaintiffs successful defense of a post-
judgment motion is indistinguishable in principle." 
Velez, 203 F.Supp.2d at 315 (internal citations 
omitted). Similarly, in Weyant v. Okst, 198 F.3d 
31L 316 (2nd Cir.1999), the court held that "[a] 
prevailing 1983 plaintiff is entitled to recover 
reasonable attorneys fees," and that "[t]his principle 
applies not only to the cost of obtaining a favorable 
judgment but also to the cost of successfully 
defending that judgment, whether against post-
judgment motions, or against an appeal." (internal 
citations omitted). In general, if the applicable law 
allows the trial court to grant attorney fees, that 
statute is also interpreted as allowing fees to the 
prevailing party on appeal. 14A Karl B. Tegland, 
Washington Practice: Civil Procedure 37.13, at 572 
(1st ed.2003). This rule should also apply to post-
judgment litigation in defense of the amount of the 
judgment. 
f 30 Further, the amount awarded was not an abuse 
of discretion. Lindsays attorney submitted a bill for 
services rendered for Lindsay between November 
2003 and April 2004. This bill included costs and 
fees for services related to opposing PTIs motions 
regarding interest and the removal of liens on PTIs 
properties. The total amount of the bill was 
$29,681.00. The trial court awarded Lindsay 
$29,643.00, apparently accepting virtually all of the 
fees and costs as reasonable. PTI asserts that the fee 
award is unreasonable because it is significantly more 
than the *686 amount in controversy. PTI points out 
that while the award was over $29,000, the amount in 
controversy was only one months interest: 
$17,926.97. 
[91 f 31 PTIs assertions are unavailing. The amount 
of the award is not dispositive of the reasonableness 
of the award. Further, PTI has made no specific 
allegations that the hourly fee charged was 
unreasonable or that Lindsays attorneys charged for 
hours spent on unsuccessful claims, duplicated effort, 
or otherwise unproductive time. See Mayer v. City 
of Seattle. 102 Wash.App. 66, 82. 10 P.3d 408 
(2000). Washington courts have refused to find 
abuse of discretion in a fee award when the only 
argument is that the fees grossly exceeded the value 
of the case. See, e.g., Lay v. Hass, 112 Wash.App. 
818.826,51 P.3d 130(2002) (refusing to overturn an 
award when the defendant's sole argument was that 
the fee awarded was 31 times the total value of the 
case). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
the award of fees. 
IV. Lindsay's Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal 
\ 32 Lindsay requests his attorney fees under RAP 
18.1 and RCW 49.48.030 for both his underlying 
action and in defending his result against PTI's cross-
appeal. As previously noted, RCW 49.48.030 
provides that employees who successfully recover 
judgment for wages or salary owed shall receive 
reasonable attorney fees. Lindsay has prevailed on 
his appeal, and he has successfully defended against 
PTI's cross-appeal. Accordingly, we award him his 
attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
f 33 Affirmed in part. Reversed in part and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
WE CONCUR: ELLINGTON, A.C.J., and BAKER, 
J. 
Wash.App. Div. 1,2005. 
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